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ABSTRACT 
 Farm Credit Mid-America is experiencing strong growth due to the success of the 
farming sector in our four state territory of Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio. The 
company is well positioned to meet the financial demands of its customers and they have 
an aggressive growth plan to increase total assets from $18 billion to $25 billion in five 
years. They also plan to add 600 new employees in that time period. Determining the 
appropriate level of capital to sustain growth and meet the demands of its customers will be 
a primary objective of the organization over the next five years. 
Permanent capital is viewed as a percentage of total assets at Farm Credit Mid-America 
with the ideal amount between 14% and 16%. A detailed analysis of the current capital 
level, regulatory requirements, and the projected future financial position of the company 
was completed to: 
· Define and understand capital as it applies to Farm Credit Mid-America; 
· Research the current capital levels for Farm Credit Mid-America;  
· Compare capital levels of Farm Credit Mid-America to capital levels of other 
Farm Credit Associations and other banks; 
· Understand Basel III Accords and how it applies to Farm Credit Mid-America’s 
capital requirements;  
· Complete sensitivity analysis with multiple scenarios applied to the current Farm 
Credit Mid-America loan portfolio to determine the effect certain events may 
have on capital levels; 
 
 
· Determine if Farm Credit Mid-America is appropriately capitalized based on the 
other objectives.  
 When looking at the results, it is determined that current capital levels are in line 
with other Farm Credit associations and competitors. Also, Farm Credit Mid-America has 
met the Basel III guidelines for minimum capital requirements. The sensitivity analysis 
included a wide range of scenarios from normal growth rates to extreme loan portfolio 
distress and the effects those scenarios would have on permanent capital. The permanent 
capital ratio exceeded the minimum standard of 12% on all sensitivity analysis scenarios. 
Therefore, based on the objectives of this thesis Farm Credit Mid-America appears to be 
adequately capitalized.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Farm Credit Mid-America is experiencing strong growth due to the success of the 
farming sector in the four state territory of Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio. 
Commodity prices are at all-time highs so most farmers have the means to borrow funds for 
additional acreage, new equipment, or for operations. The company is well positioned to 
meet the financial demands of its customers and they have an aggressive growth plan to 
increase total assets from $18 billion to $25 billion in five years. They also plan to add 600 
new employees in that time period. Determining the appropriate level of capital to sustain 
growth and meet the demands of its customers will be a primary objective of the 
organization over the next five years.  
The permanent capital ratio is the percentage of a bank’s capital to its risk-adjusted 
assets. The Basel Accords provide the framework for lending institutions regarding the 
calculations and minimum standards for banks and lending institutions. During the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 many institutions struggled because they were not capitalized 
well enough. Strong growth from 2002-2007 reduced the level of capital for some of these 
companies and ultimately put some out of business. Farm Credit Mid-America uses the 
Basel III system as it is the most recent outline provided by the Switzerland based group. 
The guidelines provided by Basel III and strong management will help the company avoid 
the problems some financial companies experienced during the financial crisis.   
 A recent annual meeting revealed Farm Credit Mid-America is growing faster than 
its plan. While this is positive news, the permanent capital ratio is currently under budget 
due to the higher growth rate. A closer look into the Basel III requirements and at other 
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financial institutions capital levels and the Farm Credit Mid-America loan portfolio will 
help determine the appropriate level of capital for the organization going forward. 
Capital is essentially equity relative to assets and helps a lending institution ensure 
viability in the event of unexpected losses. The value of this equity is it lowers costs to 
provide loanable funds, absorbs financial losses, and funds growth for the organization. 
Capital adequacy should reflect organizational risk as some institutions require a higher 
percentage of capital than others due to greater risk. Since Farm Credit is a single industry 
lender, meaning they strictly finance agriculture, Farm Credit has more risk than banks 
because banks have a more diversified portfolio (Bruce, 2011). 
Farm Credit Mid-America focuses on two ratios to determine the appropriate level 
of capital. The permanent capital ratio is unrestricted and is defined as the permanent 
capital divided by risk-adjusted assets. The core surplus ratio deducts Agribank investment 
and stock from the permanent capital ratio. Agribank is the source of funds at Farm Credit 
Mid-America and stock is the participation stock that customers purchase when they 
borrow money from the organization. These ratios are very similar in the way they are 
calculated with the core surplus ratio being slightly more conservative. The charts below 
compare the core surplus ratio between the top six Farm Credit associations in the country 
and then six banks. While the charts are from 2005, they still display the difference 
between the surplus ratios of a single industry lender like Farm Credit with a higher 
percentage of capital versus a more diversified lender like a bank (Bruce, 2011). 
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Figure 1.1: Core Surplus Ratio of Six Farm Credit Associations 
 
Figure 1.2: Core Surplus Ratio of Six Banks  
 
The objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
 Define and understand capital as it applies to Farm Credit Mid-America; 
 Research the current capital levels for Farm Credit Mid-America;  
 Compare capital levels of Farm Credit Mid-America to capital levels of other Farm 
Credit Associations and other banks;  
 Understand Basel III Accords and how it applies to Farm Credit Mid-America’s 
capital requirements;  
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 Complete sensitivity analysis with multiple scenarios applied to the current Farm 
Credit Mid-America loan portfolio to determine the effect certain events may have 
on capital levels;  
 Determine if Farm Credit Mid-America is appropriately capitalized based on the 
other objectives.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERTURE REVIEW 
The depth of literature addressing the issue of capital levels for the Farm credit 
System is significant with much of the analysis centered on the bailout of Farm credit in the 
1980s due to the agricultural crisis. There are also several articles providing general history 
of the Farm Credit System and the evolvement into today’s system. Recent works discuss 
the volatility of the agricultural market with today’s high commodity prices and the 
potential risk producers and lenders face regarding a reduction in those commodity prices. 
What follows is not a complete discussion of the prior research conducted related to capital 
levels for Farm Credit; however, the works cited provide a foundation for the Farm Credit 
System. Factors around capital levels of Farm Credit Associations during the turbulent 
1980s and current capital levels are emphasized.  
The Farm Credit System was created by Congress in 1916 to provide American 
agriculture with a dependable source of credit and is the oldest government sponsored 
enterprise (GSE). The System is comprised of a network of borrower-owned cooperative 
financial institutions in all 50 states and in Puerto Rico. Congress intended for Farm Credit 
to improve the income and well-being of the American farmer and rancher by forming the 
farmer-owned System to ensure that farmers and ranchers participate in the management, 
control, and ownership of the associations. The System helps meet rural America’s needs 
by preserving liquidity and competition in rural credit markets during good and bad 
economic times. Farm Credit is also charged with helping serve the needs of young, 
beginning, small, and minority farmers to provide credit to the next generation of farmers 
and ranchers (Farm Credit Administration 2012). 
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As of January 1, 2012 the Farm Credit System was composed of 87 banks and 
associations with Farm Credit Mid-America being the largest association in terms of total 
assets. The four banks that provide loans to the different Farm Credit associations across 
the country include: 
 CoBank, ACB 
 AgriBank, FCB 
 AgFirst Farm Credit Bank 
 Farm Credit Bank of Texas 
AgriBank is the funding source for Farm Credit Mid-America. These four banks have 
merged over the years decreasing from 37 banks down to four banks. As a government 
sponsored enterprise, Farm Credit is exempt from state and federal taxes so if Farm Credit 
were to ever lose the GSE status, the consolidation of banks and associations would likely 
occur rapidly (Johnson 2013). 
2.1 1980s 
 The 1980s were a difficult time for farmers and agricultural lenders like Farm 
Credit due to the agricultural credit crisis. Consolidation of associations was frequent 
during this decade due to a credit crunch as more than 1,000 local lending associations 
existed in the early 1980s and now there are 80 associations. Farm Credit Mid-America 
was created in 1985 by the merger of local Production Credit Associations and Federal 
Land Bank Associations (Lynn 2013). 
 The cause of the agricultural credit situation in the 1980s derived from the rapid 
inflation during the 1970s. Farmland prices escalated during the 1970s due to strong export 
demand from a single foreign country (the former U.S.S.R.) which created high commodity 
prices. Farmland prices rose with the increase in grain demand and prices. Agricultural 
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lenders loosened credit requirements in attempt to keep up with the demand in agriculture 
and farmland transactions. This easy access to credit for U.S. farmers and heavier debt 
loads ultimately put many farmers and ranchers out of business during the 1980s (Regier 
Carr & Monroe, L.L.P. 2013). 
           President Carter enacted a grain embargo to the U.S.S.R. in 1980 that banned the 
export of grain and technology to the Soviet Union in response to the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. The effects of the grain embargo to the Soviet Union were negligible 
as they simply purchased grain from South America and Europe. However, the effects to 
the U.S. agriculture markets were catastrophic. Commodity prices in the U.S. dropped 
significantly which created a ripple effect on farmland prices. Many farmers and ranchers 
were depending on the higher grain prices to repay debts so when commodity prices 
dropped, some farmers could not afford to pay back loans and other obligations. Banks and 
the Farm Credit System were greatly affected by these events. Farmland prices dropped 
more than 27% in many areas significantly reducing the collateral value Farm Credit lent 
on their loans. Ultimately the Farm Credit System was bailed out by the U.S. government 
in similar fashion to the more recent bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the 
housing crisis of 2008 (Paarlberg 2008). 
 After the devastating period of rising inflation and collapsing farmland values 
Congress made several major revisions to the structure and operation of the Farm Credit 
System. In addition to providing financial assistance in the form of fully repayable, 
privately financed line of credit guaranteed by the federal government, legislation made the 
following adjustments to the Farm Credit System.  
 Farm Credit Administration became a fully independent arm’s length regulator 
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 Risk-based capital standards were mandated, to be determined by FCA 
 The Farm Credit System Insurance Fund was created, financed by annual 
contributions from System banks 
 Farm Credit and the agricultural economy began to stabilize during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In 1992 after petitioning Congress, Farm Credit was allowed to repay the 
financial assistance early provided by legislation in 1987. During 1992, all System banks 
met or exceeded the new 7 percent risk-weighted permanent capital standard mandated by 
FCA which was an achievement that came nearly a year ahead of schedule (Farm Credit 
Council n.d.). 
 The Farm Credit System has improved financially since the late 1980s, through the 
1990s, and into the 2000s. Today, the System’s earnings, assets, and capital levels are all 
strong as exhibited in table 2.1 (Farm Credit Administration 2012). 
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Table 2.1: Farm Credit System Financial Information as of December, 31, 2011 
Dollars in thousands 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total Farm Credit 
System 
     
Gross Loan Volume 142,906,000 161,423,000 164,830,000 175,351,000 174,664,000 
Bonds and notes 155,295,000 179,769,000 178,358,000 189,575,000 186,889,000 
Nonperforming loans 621,000 2,416,000 3,535,000 3,386,000 2,997,000 
Nonaccrual loans 512,000 2,282,000 3,369,000 3,229,000 2,738,000 
Net income 2,703,000 2,916,000 2,850,000 3,495,000 3,940,000 
Nonperforming 
loans/gross loans 
0.43% 1.50% 2.14% 1.93% 1.72% 
Permanent Capital 
Ratio 
14.17% 12.65% 13.90% 14.46% 15.60% 
Core Surplus/Assets 11.52% 10.80% 11.48% 11.80% 12.90% 
Return on assets 1.53% 1.41% 1.32% 1.59% 1.71% 
Return on equity 10.38% 10.70% 9.86% 10.85% 11.17% 
Net interest margin 2.43% 2.41% 2.65% 2.82% 2.86% 
Sources: Farm Credit System Call Report as of December 31, 2011, and the Farm Credit System Annual Information Statement provided 
by the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation.  
The agricultural economy has performed extremely well over the last three to five years. 
Grain prices have increased and remain at record highs due to ethanol on the local level and 
increased global economic growth and a relatively weak dollar to support more agricultural 
exports. High feed costs have challenged livestock and dairy producers however strong 
hog, cattle, and milk prices have offset these higher feed costs to some extent enabling 
producers to have profitable years. Farmland prices have mirrored commodity prices and 
risen significantly in areas of high cash grain growth like the Corn Belt (Johnson 2013). 
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 High commodity and farmland prices experienced by farmers and ranchers over the 
last 3 to 5 years provide similarities to the inflationary period of the 1970s. Many 
economists debate whether or not the current agriculture economy is in a bubble that will 
soon burst creating another agricultural credit crisis like the U.S. saw during the 1980s. Dr. 
David M. Kohl, Professor Emeritus of Agricultural Finance and Small Business 
Management at Virginia Tech, notes that the U.S. has been in a commodity price super-
cycle for the past 10 years that has helped insulate many rural and agricultural communities 
from the worst of the Great Recession. “Only four of these super-cycles have occurred in 
the past 100 years, and they typically only last about three to four years” (Regier Carr & 
Monroe, L.L.P. 2013). The super-cycle has resulted in many young farmers having never 
experienced a downturn in agriculture and some lenders getting complacent (Regier Carr & 
Monroe, L.L.P. 2013). 
 Interestingly discussions with Farm Credit Mid-America employees during the 
1980s, then called Federal Land Bank and Production Credit Association, reveal significant 
differences in the financial position of the association now versus then. While financial 
statements from the 1980s were not available for this research, the Association’s financial 
position was weaker compared to today’s position (Bruce 2011). Prior to the merger in 
1985 to Farm Credit Mid-America, the Federal Land Banks and Production Credit 
Associations across the four state territories were smaller organizations who had limited 
amounts of capital. Permanent Capital was not a common financial ratio during those 
times, however it is estimated to have been around 5% on average for several of the 
associations (Bruce 2011). 
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Currently Farm Credit Mid-America is very strong financially and has made changes over 
the last 3-5 years to avoid a crisis if the agricultural commodity price bubble were to burst. 
Farm Credit Mid-America has reduced advanced rates to 65% loan to appraised value on 
farmland, down from 75% or even 85% in some cases. Also lending caps are in place in 
areas of higher farmland prices to loan no more than $6,500 per acre on ground. 
Management has increased the permanent capital ratio significantly in this time period as 
well, going from 12% to 16%. These strategies differ from the 85% loan to value standards 
much of the association had during the 1980s and will help reduce risk of default if 
agricultural commodity prices fall (Bruce 2011). 
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CHAPTER III: THEORY 
3.1 How Much Capital is Needed? 
 To determine capital adequacy goals and targets, Farm Credit Mid-America must 
evaluate exposure to the following risks: 
 Operational risk – Over the next five years FCMA will add 300 new employees 
and replace 300 retiring employees so 50 percent of the projected 1,200employees 
will have less than 5 years’ experience. Facilities to house these additional 
employees must be added as well. 
 Interest rate risk – Interest rates are at all-time lows so what will happen to the 
margin when the Prime and LIBOR rates increase along with long-term mortgage 
rates? 
 Credit risk – Adverse credit is 3.8% and is projected to improve to 3.4% by 2016. 
What happens if agricultural commodity prices decrease and Farm Credit 
customers experience financial problems causing the adverse credit to increase? 
 Risk associated with rapid growth – Farm Credit Mid-America has projected 
growth of approximately 7% over the next five years so what happens if growth is 
faster or slower than projected? 
 These four risk factors go into long-term and short-term planning and ultimately 
help determine the appropriate percentage of permanent capital necessary for Farm Credit 
Mid-America. The relationship of the Permanent Capital Ratio to Growth of Earning 
Assets was evaluated to analyze historical trends and validate the assumed 
interdependency. Figure 3.1 shows the correlation between growth and capital from the 
year 2000 until 2011 (Hancock 2012). Numerically the correlation is a .02 indicating there 
is no significant correlation between the growth rate and permanent capital rate.   
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Figure 3.1: Growth and Capital Correlation 2000-2011 
 
 In general there is an inverse relationship between permanent capital ratio and 
growth rate. Permanent capital builds in periods of slow growth and deteriorates in times of 
rapid growth to fund loan assets. There are always a few exceptions like in 2001 when an 
IRS refund was paid to Farm Credit Mid-America and contributed over $71 million in 
capital (Hancock 2012). After adjusting for the unusual events, the interdependent 
relationship of Permanent Capital Ratio to growth provides the following conclusions: 
 Growth environments can change dramatically from year to year as growth 
ranged from 3% to 21% between 2000 and 2011 
 Permanent Capital Ratio fluctuated between 13.3% and 15.4% and would have 
been significantly lower if not for unusual events like the IRS refund discussed 
above 
 Certain cycles create opportunities to build capital 
 Certain cycles deplete capital 
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 Planning capital adequacy in the future requires consideration of Farm Credit Mid-
America’s mission, “to be a dependable source of constructive credit and high quality 
service at the best possible value for farmers and rural residents.” To achieve this mission, 
it is necessary for the organization to take a longer-term view to ensure dependability.  
 The association has recently made changes to focus on the long-term risk 
management success of the organization. A few of the risk management initiatives 
implemented are as follows: 
 Implementing the “risk rating guidance” – A new risk rating system that 
categorizes loans on a 1 – 14 scale based on credit risk when the loan is closed. In 
the past the rating system was on a 4 point scale.  
 Critical Thinking training – All employees go through critical thinking training to 
improve credit skills. This training takes a lot of time, however the long-term 
benefit should pay off for the organization.  
3.2 Regulatory Conditions 
 Basel III was initiated to be the new global regulatory standard on banking 
adequacy and liquidity after weaknesses were exposed during the financial crisis of 2008. 
The latest Basel accord is expected to increase minimum capital requirements from 2% to 
4.5% for common equity and increase Tier 1 capital from 4% to 6% by 2015. Basel III 
remains consistent with Basel II with the standard for total capital remaining at 8%. The 
difference between the total capital requirement and the Tier 1 capital requirement can still 
be met with Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital are the same for Farm Credit 
Mid-America because the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 is the excess investment in 
AgriBank which Mid-America has none (Hancock 2012). 
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 In addition to the new minimums, Basel III also requires banks to hold a 
conservation buffer of 2.5% as additional protection against future stress. Another buffer of 
up to 2.5% could be implemented depending on national economic circumstances, bringing 
the total minimum capital plus buffers to be 9.5% for common equity and up to 13% for 
total capital. The chart below breaks down the new requirements (Hancock 2012). 
Table 3:1 BASEL III-Capital Requirements and Buffers 
 
Farm Credit Administration, which writes policy for all Farm Credit associations is 
developing proposals to change system capital regulations in response to Basel III and has 
indicated as much as an 18 to 20% Permanent Capital Ratio may be required for 
associations to be well capitalized. Since Farm Credit Mid-America is the largest 
association and represents about 10% of the system assets, Farm Credit Administration 
considers it systemically important and it is reasonable to expect the threshold to be higher 
than other associations (Hancock 2012). 
 
(all  numbers  in percentages) Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Total Capital
(after deductions)
BASEL II Minimum 2.0 4.0 8.0
BASEL III Minimum 4.5 6.0 8.0
Conservation Buffer 2.5 2.5 2.5
Minimum Plus Buffer 7.0 8.5 10.5
Countercyclical Buffer Range*
Total (Minimum + Buffers) 9.5 11.0 13.0
Critical Banks** up to 10.0 11.5 ‐ 12.5 13.5 ‐ 15.0
* Common equity or other ful ly loss  absorbing capita l
0 ‐ 2.5
** The  Independent Commiss ion on Banking (ICB) estimates  that systemica l ly important 
banks  should have  an equity ratio of at least 10% provided that they also have  genuinely loss ‐
absorbing debt;  "Unfenced" bus inesses  to operate  with 17% capita l  ratio
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3.3 Solution Development 
Regulatory requirements, economic factors, and peer benchmarking continue to 
factor into capital targets for Farm Credit Mid-America in the future. Based on the Basel III 
requirements currently in place and the current economic climate, it is hypothesized that 
Farm Credit Mid-America increase capital and establish a broader range of Permanent 
Capital Ratio targets with potential strategies to initiate as Permanent Capital Ratio moves 
out of the target range (Hancock 2012). 
The charts below give an overview of the new capital targets for the association. 
Figure 3.2 shows averages, minimums, and maximums for Farm Credit associations. 
Figure 3.3 shows the new range (Hancock 2012). 
Figure 3.2: Average, Minimum, and Maximum Capital Percent for Farm Credit 
Associations 
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Figure 3.3: Capital Percentage Ranges for Farm Credit Mid-America 
 
Figure 3.3 above was put together by the Farm Credit Mid-America finance team as a 
proposal to increase the capital percentage for the association. After the credit crisis in 
2008, the finance team knew the organization needed a higher percentage of capital to 
offset risk so the chart above is a result of the changes. The bullets below describe the chart 
in detail (Hancock 2012). 
 Change the Permanent Capital Ratio from the current range of 11 to 15% to 12 to 
18% with a desired range or “comfort zone” of 14 to 16% and target of 15%. The 
current target is 13%.  
 The comfort zone will be monitored on an ongoing basis and may change as 
capital needs and regulatory environments evolve.  
 If the Permanent Capital Ratio remains above the desired range maximum and 
forecasts suggest it will continue, then Farm Credit Mid-America will take steps 
to reduce in 0.25% increments, mainly by reducing customer interest rates.  
 If the Permanent Capital Ratio falls to within 1% of the range minimum, then the 
organization will implement strategies to slow growth to increase capital. The 
response would most likely be to raise interest rates.  
 The recommended new capital targets gives the association the following benefits: 
14 ‐ 16 %
 Capital  Moderate  Consider  Patronage
Management Increases in One‐Time
Strategies Spreads COMFORT Payouts  Take More
ZONE Risk
 No Special  Tap Brakes  Stimulate
Rates or Payouts on Growth Growth  Buy Assets
 Sell  Assets  Really Stimulate
Growth
 Slam Brakes
on Growth
< 12 % 12 ‐ 14 % 16 ‐ 18% > 18 %
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 A more consistent marketplace presence with greater ability to absorb and 
respond to economic conditions 
 More flexibility to avoid moderating or stimulating growth 
 A longer term view to evaluate where the anticipated Permanent Capital Ratio is 
to be at least three years out based on growth, risk, and sensitivity analysis 
 Additional capital may be necessary given the current regulatory environment 
with Basel III 
The December 31, 2012 permanent capital ratio for Farm Credit Mid-America is 15.76% 
which fits into the comfort zone of figure 3.3. 
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CHAPTER IV: METHODS 
 The new capital targets are based on the association’s projected growth rate of 
approximately 7% and adverse credit ranging from 3.8% to 3.4% over the next five years. 
Also the agricultural economy is projected to be strong during that time period. The 
association evaluates exposure to operational risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, and risk 
associated with growth so sensitivity analysis and stress testing was performed on six 
scenarios involving different types of risk (Bruce, 2011). 
 The stress testing allows Farm Credit Mid-America to run different scenarios and 
determine the effect on the entire loan portfolio. Most lending institutions use a form of 
stress testing when budgeting for upcoming years or prior to a change in underwriting 
standards. Farm Credit Mid-America typically completes two thorough stress tests annually 
during planning for the upcoming year in June and at the beginning of the calendar year 
(Gerstle 2013). 
 The loan analytics software used by Farm Credit Mid-America allows the 
organization to group customers by farm type whether that is grains, cattle, dairy, or rural 
residents. Customer loan and lease information is stored in an Excel database that the 
software pulls from to determine earnings, net worth, working capital, solvency, and other 
financial calculations. Stress testing is applied to the latest information for a customer to 
determine the affect certain events will have on that customer’s financial position. For 
example, if a grain farmer earns $100,000 in annual gross income and their income is 
stressed by 10% then the new income used in scenario is $90,000. Analysis is then 
completed to see how the reduction in revenue affects their cash flow if expenses remain 
the same and how that impacts their financial situation in the future (Gerstle 2013). 
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 The screen shot below shows the loan analytics software used by Farm Credit Mid-
America. This software was created by Tim Wilberding who is a former AgriBank 
employee. Farm Credit Mid-America can adjust the type of liquidity and solvency ratios to 
stress as well as other queries like loan to appraised value ratios on this screen (Gerstle 
2013). 
Figure 4.1: Loan Analytics Software used by Farm Credit Mid-America 
 
 Each loan at Farm Credit Mid-America has a probability of default or PD which is 
based on factors like the customers’ income, net worth, liquidity position, risk level of 
farming operation, and the advanced loan rate. Currently the PD scale used by Mid-
America ranges from 1-14 with PD of one having the least amount of risk. An example PD 
for a loan of $100,000 where the customer is a part-time beef cattle farmer who earns 
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$300,000 per year in the medical field, has $400,000 in working capital, a net worth of over 
$1 million, and a loan to appraised value is less than 50% would be group 1. A PD of 14 
would be a loan where the customer may be upside down in the property financed, where 
the property is worth $50,000 and they owe $100,000, they lost their job so have no 
income, have zero savings, and are about to file for bankruptcy (Gerstle 2013).  
 The screen shot below displays where Farm Credit Mid-America can make 
adjustments to the loan portfolio by stressing specific agricultural industries. Each Farm 
Credit customer has a corresponding farm type associated with it based on the percentage 
of revenue generated by that customer. The loan analytics software can then stress specific 
industries based on current agricultural economic events. For example if the poultry 
industry is predicted to be more negatively affected by increased operating expenses and 
decreased earnings then Farm Credit Mid-America can stress the industry accordingly 
(Gerstle 2013).  
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 Figure 4.2: Input Screen for Loan Analytics Software 
 
 Farm Credit Mid-America uses the probability of default to determine the credit 
strength of a particular loan and the entire loan portfolio. The PDs may be pulled at any 
time based on the latest information received from the customer. Also regulators for Farm 
Credit Mid-America’s funding source AgriBank and Farm Credit Administration review 
the PDs of the loan portfolio to determine the credit rating for the organization. Another use 
of the PD is in the loan approval system. When a loan scores a PD of 5 or less, that loan is 
typically approved by the automated system instead of being reviewed by an underwriter. 
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This automation makes the system more efficient and helps provide a better customer 
experience (Hammond 2013). 
 The Farm Credit System determines a percentage associated for each probability of 
default based on past data. Percentages vary and increase as the PD increases. Each PD also 
has an associated loss given default or LGD. Farm Credit Mid-America determines the 
LGD based on past data. Mid-America also uses a calculation to estimate the loss of each 
loan for the next 12 months and then they set aside capital to match that amount. The 
calculation is the PD * LGD * loan balance equals the amount of capital set aside for 
potential losses in the next 12 months. An example of this calculation is a PD of 9 has a 2% 
probability of default and a 6% loss given default with a loan balance of $150,000, 
meaning Farm Credit would set aside $180 of capital as the estimated loss for the next 12 
months (Gerstle 2013). 
 This type of stress testing gives Farm Credit Mid-America an idea of the potential 
credit risks of the entire loan portfolio. The organization can analyze the results of a 
particular test and determine the percentage of acceptable credits, non-acceptable credits, 
and charge-offs they may have if a particular situation were to occur. For example, this 
testing may tell Farm Credit that if grain prices fall by 25% then acceptable credit quality 
will be down to 95% from 97%, non-acceptable credit will increase to 5% from 3%, and 
charge-offs will be $50 million (Gerstle 2013). 
 Stress testing at Farm Credit Mid-America has two parts, the credit impact as 
mentioned above, and the financial impact that results from the credit side. The finance 
team looks at the predicted results of a stress test to determine the outcome to the 
corporate balance sheet and income statement. One of the primary concerns for the 
24 
 
finance team is to look at the impact these credit changes may have on capital for the 
association in the future. Two of the biggest drivers of capital changes are charge-offs or 
loan losses and net earnings. Loan losses are due to a reduction in a customer’s owner 
equity or the collateral being under-secured when a lender collects a loan. Typically a 
change to capital occurs over time due to reduction in credit quality as credit quality is a 
lagging variable. This proves true when analyzing the results of the stress testing 
(Hammond 2013). 
 A detailed look at each scenario will show how the stress testing was completed. 
Each test was compared to the preliminary “base” plan to measure the association’s 
sensitivity to changes in key performance measures like permanent capital. All scenarios 
were applied to the Farm Credit Mid-America loan portfolio as of the 9/30/2012 balance 
sheet.  
A summary of the scenarios is below: 
 Scenario 1: Series of Catastrophic Events 
o Increase in charge-offs (loan losses) – Additional $40 million (2013), $36 
million (2014), and $20 million (2015 – 2016) 
o Growth rate of 0% in 2013 and 2.5% in 2014 – 2016 
o Nonaccrual (loans that are not being charged interest daily due to non-
performance): Additional $200 million (2013), $150 million (2014), $100 
million, (2015) and $75 million (2016) 
o Reduction in interest rate margin by 0.25% in 2013 and 2014, with 
remaining years same as 2014 
o Operating expenses: 1% annual increase each year 
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The nature of this test is to determine the impact of a severely negative economic 
environment that is sustained for multiple years resulting elevated losses, reduced 
earnings, and higher costs of servicing higher risk assets (Bruce, 2011). 
 Scenario 2: Growth rate of 2.5% from 2013 – 2016 
The nature of this test is to determine how years of relatively little portfolio 
growth will change capital strength assuming no other changes in planned 
operating expenses (Bruce, 2012). 
 Scenario 3: Growth rate of +12% from 2013 – 2016 
The nature of this test is to determine how years of higher than planned growth at 
a level above the associations sustainable growth rate will erode capital strength 
assuming no changes in planned operating expenses (Bruce, 2011).  
 Scenario 4: Growth rate ramping from 4% to 12% between 2013 and 2016 
The nature of this test is to determine how portfolio growth accelerating above 
planned rates will change capital strength assuming no changes in planned 
operating expenses. This is a hybrid of scenario 3 and may be more likely due to 
an improved market focus and additional resources creating increased 
productivity during the five year period (Bruce, 2011). 
 Scenario 5: Extreme Portfolio Stress:  Applied extreme stress to customer 
earnings, reflecting what may occur if current grain prices are not sustainable and 
are significantly reduced due to increased production and/or decreased demand. 
Lower grain prices will directly impact real estate values with lower returns 
through direct production and cash rents (Hammond 2013). 
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 Reduced customer revenue by 30% which is supported by the agricultural futures 
markets showing a 20% - 25% reduction in corn and soybean prices due to an 
increase in production in 2013 (www.agriculture.com 2013). 
 Reduced customer non-current assets by 15% which includes real estate as the 
majority of these assets.  
 These changes were applied to 75% of the Farm Credit Mid-America loan 
portfolio as not every customer experiences the same level of income or asset 
reduction.  
 Growth rate was reduced from the base of 7% down to 3.5%.  
 Allowance for loan loss at 1% of total loan portfolio.  
 Association patronage from AgriBank reduced to 15 basis points.  
 Scenario 6: Less severe portfolio stress 
The nature of this test is to determine the impact of a significant, but not as 
significant as scenario 5, reduction in commodity prices to the loan portfolio. This 
scenario is more likely than scenario 5 as the adjustments are more realistic based 
on the current commodity price cycle (www.agriculture.com 2013). 
o Customer income was reduced by 20% based on an anticipated decrease in 
grain prices (www.agriculture.com 2013). 
o Charge-offs increased by $121 million and adverse credit increased from 
3.8% to 6.5% (Bruce, 2011). 
o Reduced customer noncurrent assets by 10%. 
o Applied these changes to 75% of the loan portfolio including all loan 
sectors. 
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o Allowance for loan loss at 1% of portfolio. 
The nature of this test is to assess the impact of specific less severe commodity stress 
scenarios.  
 Sensitivity analysis like the 6 scenarios above help Farm Credit Mid-America plan 
for the unexpected on an annual basis. Typically the company runs scenarios like these at 
annual planning meetings for the next year or if the organization is off target in financial 
categories like permanent capital.  
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS 
 The statement of financial condition in Table 5.1 shows the estimated forecast and 
budget or “base” estimate for Farm Credit Mid-America from 2011 to 2017. The finance 
team at Farm Credit put the budget together after market research was completed to 
estimate growth rates for the next five to ten years. Loan types are broken down into 
accrual, which means loans that are performing, and nonaccrual or substandard loans. 
Then, different loan types are identified as mortgage, commercial, or leases. Other assets 
include mission related investments that are participations with other lenders and tobacco 
investments which is money from the tobacco buyout program. Also included are leased 
equipment and acquired property and interest receivable and the investment in Agribank 
which is participation stock that customers purchase.  
 Liabilities on the balance sheet include a note payable to Agribank which is the 
largest liability. Agribank renews a line of credit annual for Farm Credit Mid-America 
which is how the organization is funded. They also have accrued interest owed to Agribank 
and other liabilities on the financial statement. Other liabilities include payroll, taxes, and 
other miscellaneous operating expenses.  
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Table 5.1: Statement of Financial Condition, 2011-2017, Forecast and Budget 
 2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  
Accrual Mortgage 
Loans 
11,560,207  13,090,399  14,763,471  16,406,554  18,182,827  20,249,104  22,628,908  
Accrual Commercial 
Loans 
2,883,597  2,880,199  2,970,085  3,054,732  3,134,155  3,212,509  3,286,397  
Accrual Finance 
Leases 
280,361  320,618  266,004  220,783  183,250  152,097  126,241  
Accrual Loans 14,724,164  16,291,216  17,999,560  19,682,069  21,500,232  23,613,710  26,041,546  
Nonaccrual Mortgage 
Loans 
238,523  195,564  163,600  140,000  120,000  120,000  128,000  
Nonaccrual Comm 
Loans & Leases 
47,963  40,095  36,400  35,000  30,000  30,000  32,000  
Nonaccrual Loans 286,486  235,659  200,000  175,000  150,000  150,000  160,000  
Gross Loans 15,010,651  16,526,875  18,199,560  19,857,069  21,650,232  23,763,710  26,201,546  
Allowance for Losses 
On Loans 
80,734  60,650  70,216  76,710  83,738  92,019  101,572  
Loans, Net 14,929,917  16,466,224  18,129,344  19,780,359  21,566,494  23,671,691  26,099,974  
Mission Related 
Investments 
1,410,903  1,450,877  1,367,038  1,306,895  1,241,787  1,184,705  1,134,661  
Tobacco Investments 210,945  144,199  74,499  0  0  0  0  
Lease Equipment, Net 281,646  323,065  290,759  261,683  235,515  211,963  190,767  
Accrued Interest 
Receivable 
128,900  129,699  143,604  155,250  167,831  182,545  199,505  
Investment in 
Agribank 
422,124  440,925  464,128  495,600  527,343  565,675  611,076  
Acquired Property, 
Net 
30,309  14,350  12,000  8,000  5,000  4,000  4,000  
Property and 
Equipment, Net 
32,851  42,380  80,601  106,789  120,417  128,970  135,922  
Other Assets 57,678  45,320  22,717  21,651  22,650  23,772  25,031  
Total Assets 17,505,272  19,057,040  20,584,690  22,136,226  23,887,038  25,973,321  28,400,936  
Note Payable 14,578,386  15,818,603  17,071,952  18,306,600  19,687,020  21,349,639  23,289,251  
Accrued Interest 
Payable 
92,107  81,645  86,740  94,717  102,840  112,240  123,971  
Other Liabilities 122,015  152,905  155,068  153,567  159,832  167,161  175,634  
Liabilities 14,792,507  16,053,153  17,313,760  18,554,884  19,949,692  21,629,040  23,588,856  
Protected Stock 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
At Risk Stock 82,000  84,541  87,217  89,857  92,497  95,137  97,777  
Surplus 2,630,765  2,919,345  3,183,713  3,491,484  3,844,849  4,249,144  4,714,303  
Capital 2,712,765  3,003,886  3,270,930  3,581,341  3,937,346  4,344,281  4,812,080  
Liabilities And Capital 17,505,272  19,057,040  20,584,690  22,136,226  23,887,038  25,973,321  28,400,936  
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The base financial statement displays roughly 6% growth in total assets between 2011 and 
2017, and 7% between 2013 and 2017.  The growth rate is the main component in 
completing sensitivity analysis on a loan portfolio to stress test for capital adequacy. The 
scenarios demonstrate that the growth rate has a major effect on capital when comparing 
the base balance sheet for Farm Credit Mid-America’s 5 year business plan versus the 
extreme scenario 5 balance sheet (Table 5.2). The remaining scenario balance sheets are in 
the appendix.
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Table 5.2: Statement of Financial Condition, 2011-2017, Sensitivity 5 
(In Thousands)          
   2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
         
Accrual Mortgage Loans 11,560,20
7  
12,835,115  14,510,093  14,677,591  14,865,627  15,511,425  16,164,219  
Accrual Commercial 
Loans 
2,883,597  3,047,292  3,135,666  3,163,574  3,196,159  3,324,325  3,454,306  
Accrual Finance Leases 280,361  292,859  243,073  245,237  247,763  257,698  267,774  
Accrual Loans 14,724,16
4  
16,175,267  17,888,833  18,086,402  18,309,548  19,093,447  19,886,299  
Nonaccrual Mortgage 
Loans 
238,523  188,000  163,600  601,760  1,023,760  1,010,480  1,030,080  
Nonaccrual Comm Loans 
& Leases 
47,963  41,500  36,400  150,440  255,940  252,620  257,520  
Nonaccrual Loans 286,486  229,500  200,000  752,200  1,279,700  1,263,100  1,287,600  
Gross Loans 15,010,65
1  
16,404,767  18,088,833  18,838,602  19,589,248  20,356,547  21,173,899  
Allowance for Losses On 
Loans 
80,734  63,126  69,726  189,835  197,359  205,094  213,331  
Loans, Net 14,929,91
7  
16,341,641  18,019,107  18,648,767  19,391,889  20,151,453  20,960,568  
Mission Related 
Investments 
1,410,903  1,465,862  1,381,158  1,393,450  1,407,803  1,464,255  1,521,508  
Tobacco Investments 210,945  144,349  74,807  0  0  0  0  
Lease Equipment, Net 281,646  303,794  273,414  275,848  278,689  289,864  301,198  
Accrued Interest 
Receivable 
128,900  131,612  143,350  144,895  146,646  152,876  159,179  
Investment in Agribank 422,124  441,648  462,050  475,225  489,507  506,905  525,433  
Acquired Property, Net 30,309  16,975  12,000  8,000  5,000  4,000  4,000  
Property and Equipment, 
Net 
32,851  38,382  77,996  104,789  120,360  131,417  141,186  
Other Assets 57,678  35,296  20,413  17,856  18,494  19,222  19,976  
Total Assets 17,505,27
2  
18,919,560  20,464,295  21,068,829  21,858,389  22,719,992  23,633,048  
Note Payable 14,578,38
6  
15,699,485  16,968,640  17,489,168  18,173,042  18,968,314  19,808,782  
Accrued Interest Payable 92,107  85,631  86,971  97,855  102,560  106,493  111,171  
Other Liabilities 122,015  134,734  143,742  137,914  139,096  139,697  140,060  
Liabilities 14,792,50
7  
15,919,850  17,199,353  17,724,936  18,414,698  19,214,503  20,060,013  
Protected Stock 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
At Risk Stock 82,000  84,577  87,217  89,857  92,497  95,137  97,777  
Surplus 2,630,765  2,915,132  3,177,725  3,254,036  3,351,193  3,410,352  3,475,258  
Capital 2,712,765  2,999,709  3,264,942  3,343,893  3,443,690  3,505,489  3,573,035  
Liabilities And Capital 17,505,27
2  
18,919,560  20,464,295  21,068,829  21,858,389  22,719,992  23,633,048  
 
Despite the increase in loan losses in the scenario, the capital percentage remains the same 
as the actual budget for one year until decreasing slightly in 2014 to 15.3% versus the 
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actual budget of 15.5%. The increase in bad loans in scenario 5 has a greater effect on 
capital percentage in years 4 and 5 as credit quality is a lagging variable meaning it takes 
time for a bad loan to negatively impact the loan portfolio. Since growth was half as much 
in this scenario at 3.5% as the forecasted growth rate of 7%, the capital percentage had less 
of an impact than if the growth rates were the same (Gerstle 2013). 
 Table 5.3 compares the capital percentage of the actual Farm Credit Mid-America 
budget to the capital percentage of scenario 5. As mentioned previously, scenario 5 capital 
remains in line with budget until 2014 when it decreases to 15.3% from the budgeted 
15.5%. The increase in allowance for loan losses begins to have a greater impact in 2015 to 
2017 in scenario 5.  
Table 5.3: Permanent Capital Ratio – Base Budget vs. Sensitivity Analysis 5 
 2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  
CAPITAL                  
5 year forecasted budget-
Permanent Capital Ratio 
14.8% 15.5% 15.5% 15.5% 15.7% 15.9% 16.1%
Sensitivity Analysis 5-
Permanent Capital Ratio 
14.8% 15.5% 15.5% 15.3% 15.2% 14.9% 14.5%
 
While stress testing loan portfolios encompass several factors including a reduction in 
customer’s assets and earnings and the market price of commodities, the only two that have 
a direct impact on the actual capital percentage of Farm Credit Mid-America are growth 
and loan and lease losses. The other factors have an indirect impact on capital adequacy as 
they can lower or increase probability of default which is a lagging factor to determine 
future growth and potential loan losses (Gerstle 2013). 
 Farm Credit Mid-America views capital adequacy as a leverage ratio. The 
numerator is the net worth or total risk weighted assets minus total liabilities and the 
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denominator is risk weighted assets.  Loan and lease losses have a direct impact on this 
calculation as a loss reduces the capital or numerator to cover that loss while the risk 
weighted asset or denominator remains the same. Growth on the other hand has a direct 
impact on the denominator as the risk weighted assets grow when making more loans and 
leases however capital “declines” when assets grow although the organization has not 
“lost” any capital. For example, currently Farm Credit Mid-America has about $20 billion 
in assets and about $3.5 billion in capital. This equates to 17.5% in a permanent capital 
ratio.  If the organization grows to $22 billion this year and capital remained the same at 
$3.5 billion then the permanent capital ratio declined to 15.9% even though the association 
did not lose any capital (Gerstle 2013).  
 Table 5.4 shows the impact of these scenarios on the Permanent Capital Ratio. It 
also includes 2011 and 2012 which the capital levels are unchanged since the test is for 
years 2013 – 2017. Based on the new plan of increasing capital as shown on Figure 5.1, 
and discussed in chapter 3, all capital levels exceed the minimum 12% capital target. Table 
5.5 shows the Core Surplus Ratio of the stress tests. Core Surplus is a more conservative 
ratio as it deducts the customers’ stock purchase. While these ratios are lower than the 
Permanent Capital Ratio, they still exceed the 12% minimum requirement for capital 
(Bruce, 2011).  
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Table 5.4: Scenarios Permanent Capital Ratios 
 2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  
CAPITAL                  
5 year forecasted budget-
Permanent Capital Ratio 
14.8% 15.5% 15.5% 15.5% 15.7% 15.9% 16.1%
Scenario 1(Catastrophic 
Events) 
14.8% 15.5% 15.6% 16.3% 17.0% 17.7% 18.4%
Scenario 2 (Growth @ 
2.5%) 
14.8% 15.5% 16.1% 17.2% 18.4% 19.5% 20.7%
Scenario 3 (Growth @ 
12%) 
14.8% 15.5% 14.9% 14.6% 14.2% 13.9% 13.5%
Scenario 4 (Growth @ 
+4-12%) 
14.8% 15.5% 15.9% 16.2% 16.1% 15.6% 15.1%
Scenario 5 (Extreme 
Portfolio Stress) 
14.8% 15.5% 15.5% 15.3% 15.2% 14.9% 14.5%
Scenario 6 (Less Severe 
Portfolio Stress) 
14.8% 15.5% 15.4% 16.3% 17.1% 17.9% 18.5%
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Table 5.5: Scenarios Core Surplus Ratio 
 2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  
CAPITAL                  
5 year forecasted budget-
Permanent Capital Ratio 
14.3% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.27% 15.4% 15.7% 
Scenario 1(Catastrophic 
Events) 
14.3% 15.0% 15.1% 15.9% 16.6% 17.2% 17.9% 
Scenario 2 (Growth @ 
2.5%) 
14.3% 15.0% 15.7% 16.7% 17.9% 18.9% 20.2% 
Scenario 3 (Growth @ 
12%) 
14.3% 15.0% 14.2% 14.1% 13.8% 13.4% 12.9% 
Scenario 4 (Growth @ 
+4-12%) 
14.3% 15.0% 15.5% 15.7% 15.8% 14.6% 14.5% 
Scenario 5 (Extreme 
Portfolio Stress) 
14.3% 15.0% 15.0% 14.8% 14.7% 14.4% 14.0% 
Scenario 6 (Less Severe 
Portfolio Stress) 
14.3% 15.0% 15.0% 15.8% 16.7% 17.4% 18.0% 
 
 
Figure 5:1 Capital Percentage Ranges for Farm Credit Mid-America 
 
 
14 ‐ 16 %
 Capital  Moderate  Consider  Patronage
Management Increases in One‐Time
Strategies Spreads COMFORT Payouts  Take More
ZONE Risk
 No Special  Tap Brakes  Stimulate
Rates or Payouts on Growth Growth  Buy Assets
 Sell  Assets  Really Stimulate
Growth
 Slam Brakes
on Growth
< 12 % 12 ‐ 14 % 16 ‐ 18% > 18 %
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Scenario 3 has the greatest potential to reduce Permanent Capital Ratio and is the 
only scenario to decrease below the 14% minimum target. Scenario 3 is highly optimistic 
and does demonstrate the impact of growth but the association may choose to consider 
strategies to manage capital to a higher level were growth at this or higher levels to occur. 
An asset pool sale, like selling a portion of the loan portfolio, might be a strategy applied if 
growth were at this level or higher in the future.  
Conversely, scenarios 1, 2, and 6 have the greatest impact to increase Permanent 
Capital Ratio above the maximum of 18% due to negative portfolio growth. The 
sustainable growth rate given current net earnings assumptions is higher than planned at 
8.3% while the compound growth rate for earning assets in the plan is around 7.2%.  
Therefore, Farm Credit Mid-America expects to grow capital over the five year planning 
period.   
 In summary, permanent capital appears to adequately sustain such significant 
events as shown in these scenarios.  Permanent capital is also sufficient to meet the 
minimum standards set aside by the Basel III Accords. Loan growth remains the factor with 
the greatest impact to Permanent Capital Ratio.     
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS 
An advantage Farm Credit has over some institutions is the availability of 
customers’ recent financial information that allows for a realistic impact of economic stress 
on the loan portfolio. Scenarios are based on actual financial information from the customer 
base and the projected migration of probability of default and loss given default leads to a 
more meaningful capital adequacy test. 
 The sensitivity analysis completed displays the large impact growth and credit risk 
have on Farm Credit Mid-America’s loan portfolio. While credit and growth challenges 
can create problems for well capitalized institutions, they can have devastating impacts on 
organizations that do not have enough capital. The economic crisis in 2008-2009 displayed 
the importance of appropriate capital levels to lenders across the globe that will be a lesson 
for financial companies for generations to come.  
 The main objectives covered in this thesis are as follows. 
 Objective one of this thesis was to define and understand capital as it applies to 
Farm Credit Mid-America. Capital is essentially total assets minus total liabilities 
or the equity that the company has at a given moment in time.  
 Objective two was to research the current capital levels for Farm Credit Mid-
America. Based on the December 31, 2012 financial statement the permanent 
capital ratio was 15.76%.  
 Objective three was to compare the capital levels for Farm Credit Mid-America to 
capital levels of other Farm Credit Associations and banks. Figures 1.1, 1.2, and 
2.1 display permanent capital ratios and core surplus ratios of other Farm Credit 
Associations and banks. Mid-America compares favorably to these organizations 
at 15.76% permanent capital. Most of the Farm Credit Associations have similar 
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capital and core surplus percentages however banks are significantly lower. Banks 
do not have as stringent of a capital requirement because they have a more diverse 
asset base and less risk than Farm Credit as Farm Credit associations are single 
asset agricultural lenders.    
 Objective four was to understand Basel III Accords and how it applies to Farm 
Credit Mid-America’s capital requirements. As documented in table 3.1, the new 
Basel III standards require a maximum of 13.5% to 15% capital. Farm Credit 
Mid-America currently has 15.76% capital and exceeds the threshold 
recommended by Basel III.   
 Objective five was to complete sensitivity analysis with multiple scenarios applied 
to the current Farm Credit Mid-America loan portfolio to determine the effect 
certain events may have on capital levels. The only scenario to decrease capital 
below the comfort zone was scenario 3 which was 12%+ growth. Growth rates 
have the greatest impact on capital levels with high assets rates decreasing capital 
and low growth rates increasing capital. The remaining scenarios were either within 
the comfort zone or above the comfort zone.  
 Objective six was to determine if Farm Credit Mid-America is appropriately 
capitalized based on the other objectives. Current capital level of 15.76% and the 
estimated capital levels of the base budget show that Farm Credit Mid-America is 
well capitalized to meet the growth estimates and regulatory standards in the future.  
 In addition to the objectives covered ,there were additional takeaways from this 
research. First is the substantial impact that growth rate has on capital. When completing 
the stress testing, it was assumed that scenario 5 would have the greatest negative impact 
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on capital percentage due to the large loan losses. However because of the slow growth rate 
for that scenario the capital percentage was not as negatively impacted as the scenarios with 
high growth rates.  
 Next is the reaction Farm Credit Mid-America made in 2007 during a period of 
high growth rates. From 2005 through 2007 Farm Credit Mid-America experienced very 
fast growth which decreased the capital percentages. Leadership surprised employees 
during that time by increasing interest rates on certain loan products which slowed growth 
by making the organization less competitive. Farm Credit Mid-America also sold loans 
during that time to Agribank in an attempt to increase capital. As employees reflect back on 
those years they realize the reason behind the decision to increase interest rates and sell 
assets was to boost capital.  
 Lastly, it would be interesting to research what potential effects on Farm Credit 
Mid-America’s loan portfolio would decrease capital percentages below the minimum 12% 
requirement. Although it is highly unlikely for the sake of research actual loan losses were 
increased to $1 billion dollars to analyze the result on capital. Asset growth was set at 2.5% 
for this scenario. Permanent capital began at 18.39% with risk adjusted assets at roughly 
$17.5 billion and $3.2 billion in capital which is similar to the levels in scenario 2. 
Permanent Capital Ratio dropped to 14.18% in year one with this scenario. When actual 
losses of $1 billion were applied in year two as well then Permanent Capital decreased to 
9.25% which is below the minimum 12% requirement. This scenario is not likely as Farm 
Credit Mid-America would hold those assets and wait for the market to rebound instead of 
selling at such substantial losses of $1 billion in consecutive years. It is interesting to see 
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the level of losses required to decrease capital below the minimum 12% requirement 
(Gerstle 2013). 
 Figure 6.1: Capital Results Based on $1 Billion Loss in Consecutive Years 
 
 
 It would be interesting to research the effects on capital with a period of sustained 
high growth rate like scenario 3 and substantial loan losses like in scenario 5. It is 
hypothesized that the capital percentages would be negatively impacted more in this 
scenario than any of the six scenarios in this stress test. Also, it would be interesting to 
research this topic again in 3-4 years to compare Farm Credit Mid-America’s 5 year plan 
with the actual results.  Overall, it appears Farm Credit Mid-America is adequately 
capitalized to meet Basel III regulations and to withstand potential financial turmoil over 
the next five years.  
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